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Abstract 
Contrary to what is often asserted in debates on the “war on terror”, 
international law provides specific rules on what is allowed in bringing 
suspected terrorists to trial. This article suggests a method to identify the 
minimum fair trial rights which have to be provided to every accused, 
irrespective of his or her status in international law and irrespective of 
whether the situation amounts to an armed conflict or not. This essay 
proceeds from the assertion that human rights law applies in peacetime as 
well as in times of emergency, including in armed conflict. Because the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits any 
derogation measures inconsistent with the State’s other obligations under 
international law, the so-called principle of consistency lends itself as the 
tool to identify which aspects of Article 14 of the Covenant must be 
considered non-derogable. The article concludes that those aspects of fair 
trial which are common to the legal regimes dealing with both types of 
armed conflict – international and non-international – are also part of 
customary international law and provide the minimum yardstick from which 
no reduction is permissible. 
A. Introduction 
This article suggests a methodology of how the non-derogable aspects 
of the right to a fair trial can be identified. It provides a recommendation as 
to how to compile the list of judicial safeguards which have to be provided 
to every accused, irrespective of his or her status in international law and 
irrespective of whether the situation amounts to an armed conflict or not. 
The main point of the present essay is that current legal discussions about 
the applicable law in the “war on terror” do not sufficiently recognize that a 
minimum level of due process must be provided to all accused; regardless of 
whether humanitarian treaty law applies or not. 
This minimum level of due process is identified with the help of the 
so-called principle of consistency. The principle of consistency is the 
prohibition of derogation measures “inconsistent with [a State party’s] other 
obligations under international law”.
1
 This essay focuses on the reasons why 
1  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Art. 4(1), 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR]. 
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I suggest the principle of consistency as the most adequate tool for 
identifying the minimum, non-derogable, judicial guarantees. 
Derogations under exceptional circumstances allow a State to 
temporarily curtail some human rights. The effect of a valid derogation is to 
allow a State to take measures that would normally be a violation of its 
obligations. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) is the Covenant’s Article dealing with fair trial. It is not 
listed among the categorically non-derogable rights such as the prohibition 
of torture or slavery.
2
 But recognizing that Article 14 in principle is 
derogable does not imply that States facing an emergency can depart from 
the right to a fair trial as they see fit. Because the Covenant does not specify 
which of the aspects of fair trial can never be dispensed with,
3
 this article 
suggests that the non-derogable aspects of Article 14 can and should be 
identified with the help of the principle of consistency. 
If this logic is accepted, arguments on the qualification of an act of 
terrorism as an armed conflict or the legal status of detainees become less 
important because an elaborate list of fair trial guarantees has to be provided 
in all circumstances and to all individuals by virtue of their nature as non-
derogable safeguards. This framework provides a strong contention against 
arguments that certain individuals are situated in legal gray zones between 
human rights law and international humanitarian law. Whether and which 
parts of humanitarian treaty law apply to a detainee caught in the “war on 
terror”
4
 is, of course, not irrelevant. However, it is crucial to acknowledge 
that a considerable number of judicial guarantees can never be dispensed 
with.
The article proceeds as follows: Section A explains why the ICCPR is 
the right instrument to start the analysis as to which minimum judicial 
standards are applicable in times of terrorism, and indeed, any other 
circumstances. Section B outlines the criteria of valid derogations, in 
particular the prohibition of derogations inconsistent with the State’s other 
obligations under international law. Section C suggests applying the 
principle of consistency to the administration of justice and explains how 
2  Id., Article 4(2). 
3  The exception is the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws which is explicitly non-
derogable. Id., Article 4(2). 
4  I employ the term “war on terror” to designate the current strategies, activities and 
doctrines employed to counter terrorism. I do, however, reject the idea that all 
counter-terrorist measures automatically take place in the framework of armed 
conflict. 
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the non-derogable aspects of Article 14 of the ICCPR can be derived by 
reference to those rights common to both types of armed conflict and part of 
customary international law. A cursory discussion of recent developments 
reveals both the legal and practical benefits of enhancing attention to the 
derogation regime (Section D). 
The article will conclude that the principle of consistency is a useful 
tool to identify the non-derogable judicial safeguards which are – at the very 
minimum – applicable in times of terrorism. 
B. Armed Conflict, States of Emergency and the “War 
on Terror” 
The argument of this paper is that the principle of consistency can be 
used to determine the implicitly non-derogable aspects of Article 14 of the 
ICCPR. Before I explore the use of obligations under customary law to 
review whether anti-terrorist measures are consistent with a State’s other 
obligations under international law, this section affirms that the ICCPR is 
the right instrument to identify the criteria of valid derogations. Because 
human rights law continues to apply in times of armed conflict and other 
situations of emergency, the derogation regime of the ICCPR is the most 
relevant place to start our inquiry. The system of the derogation clause – 
Article 4 of the ICCPR – was put in place to safeguard the rule of law in 
times of extraordinary challenges. Recent case-law has confirmed that while 
acts of terrorism may be such an extraordinary challenge, terrorism does not 
warrant a re-interpretation of the extent of possible derogations.
5
 Also 
5  See for instance: A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, UKHL 56 (2004). The UK court was 
asked to consider whether the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 were 
in breach of the UK Human Rights Act giving effect to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). On appeal, the judges by a majority upheld the possibility of 
derogation but decided that the provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Act were in breach of 
the Convention because of their discriminatory nature and because the measures were 
not held to be "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". While the court 
does not interpret the derogation regime of the ICCPR, but the one of the ECHR, the 
case illustrates that courts have deemed it adequate to apply the established rules of 
the game with regard to derogations. See also: Public Committee Against Torture in 
Israel v. the State of Israel, Supreme Court of Israel, HCJ 769/02 (2005). Upholding 
the non-derogability of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, the court rejected the Government's arguments on possible 
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according to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, terrorism 
does not justify a departure from the framework of international law in 
general and the derogation regimes in particular.
6
As confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), if an armed 
conflict is found to exist, human rights law does not cease to apply. The 
derogation regime determines if a partial departure from human rights law is 
acceptable. Whether or not – or under which circumstances – international 
terrorism amounts to an armed conflict, and if so, what type, is hotly 
debated. But since the derogation regime was designed to deal with all
“public emergencies which threaten the life of the nation”,
7
 the 
consideration of the principle of consistency can be made for all states of 
emergency, irrespective of whether the specific emergency amounts to an 
armed conflict. This is precisely why the recourse to Article 4 of the ICCPR 
is a convenient tool to identify the minimum safeguards applicable in all 
circumstances. At the same time, it must be stressed that this paper does not 
address which higher standards simultaneously apply to authorities in 
bringing suspected terrorists to trial, especially in light of the fact that since 
September 11, 2001, no State except the United Kingdom has notified a 
derogation, and the UK derogation refers to Article 9 and not Article 14 of 
the Covenant.
8
C. The Applicability of Human Rights Law 
The Bush Administration originally attempted to argue that the “war 
on terror” was “something completely different from anything that States 
had to deal with before”.
9
 By considering the war on terror as a sui generis
justifications for the employment of physical means during the interrogation of 
individuals suspected of hostile terrorist activities. 
6  European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Protection of 
Human Rights in Emergency Situations Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 
66th Plenary Session, Venice, 17-18 March 2006, CDL-AD(2006)015, para. 30. 
7  ICCPR, Art. 4(1) (supra note 1). While the United States of America did not invoke a 
derogation after September 11, 2001, the 9/11 attacks would probably have qualified 
as an “emergency threatening the life of the nation”. It, however, remains doubtful 
whether the Human Rights Committee would accept claims that such an emergency 
exists today in the USA or whether allied States such as the United Kingdom could 
benefit from the derogation provision. 
8  Declaration contained in a Note Verbale from the Permanent Representation of the 
United Kingdom, dated 18 December 2001, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm (last visited 27 September 2008). 
9  The quotation referring to the distinct nature of terrorism is from: Jeffrey Kovar, 
(Legal Adviser, US Mission to the United Nations), “US Views on International 
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category in international law, the application of the rules of international 
humanitarian law as well as the derogation clauses has been denied. The 
claim that the Geneva Conventions were generally inadequate in the various 
situations related to the “war on terror” was vehemently challenged by the 
US. Its current view towards international humanitarian law now rather 
focuses on the argument that humanitarian law supplants human rights law 
in the circumstances under review.
10
 It is argued that while the ICCPR and 
its derogation provision are irrelevant, the detainees do not qualify for 
specific protections under international humanitarian law.
11
 This 
interpretation of the lex specialis doctrine is however inconsistent with 
treaty law as well as with judicial decisions and the teachings of highly 
qualified publicists.
12
 The wording of Article 4 of the Covenant refers to a 
Humanitarian Law and the War on Terror”, Lecture delivered at the Graduate Institute 
of International Studies, Point d'Actualité HEI, Geneva, 15 May 2007. Although not 
speaking on the legal qualification of terrorism but on the issue of self-defense against 
non-state actors, President Bush emphasized that “new threats also require new 
thinking”: George Bush, “Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of 
the United States Military Academy in Westpoint”, 1 June 2002, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (last visited 
11 November 2008). 
10  Claiming that the Inter-American Commission acted without basis in requesting 
precautionary measures in the case of detainees in Guantánamo, the United States 
argued that it is humanitarian law, and not human rights law, that governs the 
treatment of the detainees and that the Commission did not have the competence to 
apply international humanitarian law. See Response of the United States to Request 
for Precautionary Measures - Detainees in Guantánamo Bay, International Legal 
Materials 41 (2002), 1015. See also Reply of the Government of the United States of 
America to the Report of the Five UNCHR Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 10 March 2006, 22-24, available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ 
ilib0603212.pdf (last visited 29 September 2008). 
11  Jay S. Bybee, US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President. Re: Status of Taliban Forces Under 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (7 February 2002), reprinted in 
Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel (eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib (2005), 136-143. For an outline of US arguments on international 
humanitarian law after September 11, see David Forsythe, The United States and 
International Humanitarian Law, Journal of Human Rights 7 (2008) 1, 29. 
12  See for instance Theodor Meron, Human Rights in Time of Peace and in Time of 
Armed Strife: Selected Problems, in Thomas Buergenthal (ed.), Contemporary Issues 
in International Law: Essays in Honor of Louis B. Sohn, (1984), 1-21. Louise 
Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vité, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law, International Review of the Red Cross 293 (1993), 94-119. William A. Schabas,
Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law 
and the Law of Armed Conflict, Israel Law Review 40 (2007) 2, 592-613. 
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“public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” and it seems 
difficult to claim that situations of armed conflict or terrorism were not 
included in the ordinary meaning of these terms. Indeed, armed conflict and 
terrorist violence were specifically discussed by the drafters of the Covenant 
when they negotiated the wording of Article 4.
13
The ICJ has ruled several times on the application of human rights law 
in armed conflict. It held that the question whether a human rights provision 
applies during armed conflict should be answered by looking at the 
derogation regimes. The ICJ confirmed in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion,
14
as well as in the Wall Opinion
15
 that as long as a State has not validly 
derogated from a provision, the norm applies irrespective of the existence of 
an emergency. The ICJ affirmed the simultaneous application of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) v. Uganda case and concluded that 
international humanitarian law and human rights obligations were binding 
on the Ugandan troops occupying the DRC.
16
In his separate opinion in the DRC v. Uganda case, Bruno Simma 
noted that “no gaps exist in the law that would deprive the affected persons 
of any legal protection”.
17
 Judge Simma stressed that the victims of the 
attacks by Congolese soldiers at the Kinshasa airport in 1998 remained 
legally protected against maltreatment, irrespective of their nationality, by 
international human rights and international humanitarian law. Furthermore, 
according to him, Uganda would have had standing to raise these violations 
before the ICJ, because such minimum protections were obligations owed 
erga omnes.
18
In short, given that human rights law continues to apply in times of 
emergency, the protections of the ICCPR remain applicable. Following from 
13 David Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial Under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Chapter 4 
(2001). 
14 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.Reports 
1996, 226-267, 240 (para. 25). 
15 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 134-203, 178 (para. 106). 
16 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Report 
2005, 1-104, 71 (para. 220) [hereinafter DRC v. Uganda]. 
17 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, 5 (para. 19). 
18 Id., 10 (paras 32-35). 
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the ICJ’s words in the two Advisory Opinions, the derogation regime 
constitutes the hinge between human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. Therefore, to determine if a State can validly depart from 
judicial safeguards contained in Article 14 of the Covenant, we shall have 
recourse to Article 4 of the ICCPR. Article 4 contains the conditions of 
valid derogations. The next section in particular introduces the condition of 
consistency.
D. The Criteria of Valid Derogations from the ICCPR 
Derogation clauses safeguard the right of national governments to deal 
with public emergencies. Article 4(1) stipulates that derogations can only be 
made in officially proclaimed emergencies which threaten the life of the 
nation; the measures must be strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation; they must be non-discriminatory and must not be inconsistent with 
the State’s other obligations under international law. Article 4(2) lists the 
articles from which no derogation is ever allowed (such as the prohibition of 
slavery). Interestingly, the United States’ delegation during the drafting of 
the Covenant originally advocated an inclusion of the entire fair trial 
provision among the explicitly non-derogable rights.
19
 This article does not 
go as far as to suggest that States do not have any leeway with judicial 
procedures during emergencies. But it underlines that there is no legally 
sound argument allowing States in countering terrorism – or in any other 
situation – to depart from the minimum judicial safeguards that apply even 
in the worst forms of emergencies. 
The last paragraph of Article 4 contains procedural requirements. The 
disagreement as to whether failure to comply with the notification 
requirements automatically invalidates the derogation is unresolved.
20
 But 
19  UN Doc. E/CN.4/325 (13 June 1949). Proposal of the United States that “[t]he rights 
and freedoms set forth in […] article 13 [14], article 14 [15] and article 15 [16], of this 
Covenant shall not be subject to any limitation”. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 (29 May 
1950), para. 140. The United States were voting in favor of accepting the proposal to 
include the full fair trial provision among the non-derogable rights. For a summary of 
the travaux préparatoires of Article 4, see David Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial 
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Chapter 4 (2001). 
20  Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Committee: General Comment 29, Human Rights Law 
Review 2 (2002) 1, 81, 95-96; Apart from the United Kingdom, no State notified 
derogations from the Covenant. UN bodies interpreted the absence of formal 
derogation from the US and rejected the possibility of a de facto derogation; see also: 
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even if a de facto derogation was accepted, the principle of consistency 
ensures that a number of aspects of fair trial are effectively non-derogable. 
E. The Principle of Consistency 
My proposition is that the principle of consistency is the central tool to 
identify the non-derogable aspects of Article 14. A State can only derogate 
from provisions of the ICCPR insofar as the measures are consistent with all 
its other obligations under international law,
21
 including customary 
international law. 
The drafting history of the principle of consistency supports using it to 
identify the non-derogable aspects of Article 14. The idea of consistency 
was first introduced in 1950 by the US delegation. Eleanor Roosevelt 
mentioned on behalf of her delegation that the conduct of States in 
emergencies had already been regulated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
22
The US delegation thus advocated that the drafters of the Covenant take 
advantage of this legislation, instead of trying to work out which aspects of 
due process should be entrenched from derogation. This logic was accepted 
by consensus.
23
 The explanation of the US proposal explicitly referred to the 
methodology employed throughout this article: “the State’s other 
obligations” such as those due under humanitarian law provide the answer 
to what aspects of the right to fair trial can not be derogated from. The 
drafters accordingly intended that reference to humanitarian standards 
should be made when considering the consistency of a derogation measured 
against a State’s other obligations. 
The next section considers what “other obligations under international 
law” are relevant in determining which aspects of the fair trial provision are 
non-derogable.
Situation of the Detainees at Guantánamo, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (15 February 
2006) (prepared by Leila Zerrougui et al.). 
21  ICCPR, Art. 4(1) (supra note 1). 
22  Summary Records of the Commission on Human Rights, Fifth Session, R. 195, 
para. 45, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 195 (29 May 1950) (Remarks of Eleanor Roosevelt).
23 Jaime Oraá, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (1992), 191. 
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F. “Other Obligations Under International Law”: 
Juxtaposing the two Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions and Customary Law 
It is possible to identify which aspects of Article 14 of the Covenant 
must be considered non-derogable by analyzing the customary “other 
obligations” incumbent on all States. The argument is based on the idea that 
those guarantees which are non-derogable for both types of armed conflict – 
the most serious emergencies – must also be considered non-derogable in all 
other situations of exigency. Those aspects of due process are also part of 
customary international law. Any derogation from these aspects is 
inconsistent with “a State’s other obligations under international law”, and 
therefore invalid. The characterization of certain obligations as part of the 
customary international law applicable in both types of armed conflict 
entails the applicability of those norms to all types of emergency. Because 
they are part of a “State’s other obligations”, measures departing from these 
obligations contravene the principle of consistency in Article 4(1) of the 
Covenant. From my point of view, if a standard of fair trial applies in both 
types of armed conflict, there is no good reason that a State should be 
allowed to provide lower standards if faced with an emergency which does 
not amount to an armed conflict. 
The reader may legitimately ask why this essay emphasizes that 
certain aspects of Article 14 are non-derogable only to say that these non-
derogable aspects are congruent with obligations of States under customary 
international law. It is true that one could simply point out that, for instance, 
the US Military Commissions Act violates customary international law. 
However, given the views held by some that there are gaps in the law and 
that the existing international legal framework is unsuitable to address 
challenges posed by terrorism, the derivation of the same results from the 
machinery of one of the most widely ratified international treaties provides a 
strong confirmation that certain standards of fair trial can never be 
dispensed with. After all, the derogation regime was specifically designed to 
be applicable in times of extraordinary challenges. The suggested method 
also preventively answers arguments that customary international law may 
also allow derogations. By analyzing which judicial standards have to be 
provided even in the worst forms of emergency – those standards common 
to both types of armed conflict and at the same time part of customary law – 
the non-derogable aspects of fair trial can be identified. This is the minimum 
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level of due process applicable in the “war on terror” to all accused 
individuals under a State’s control. 
The convergence of the fair trial articles in the two 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions provides a sound basis for an 
assessment of the customary minimum standard of a fair trial.
24
 Additional 
Protocol I (AP I) regulates international armed conflicts and Additional 
Protocol II (AP II) extends protection to victims of internal conflicts. 
Broadly speaking, those judicial standards which are common to both 
protocols are applicable in both types of armed conflict.
25
The principle of consistency only refers to the standards of the Geneva 
Conventions and their protocols in those cases in which the treaties are 
applicable and to those individuals to which they apply ratione personae.
An emergency which does not amount to armed conflict does not justify the 
application of the conventions as treaty law. However, the minimum 
obligations of humanitarian law are also part of customary international law 
and, as mentioned above, part of the State’s other obligations under 
international law in all types of emergency. The debate as to the relationship 
between opinio juris and State practice for the creation of custom in the 
field of human rights and humanitarian law falls outside the scope of this 
article. I therefore suggest taking advantage of the monumental study on 
customary international humanitarian law conducted by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
26
 The study carefully assesses both 
State practice and opinio juris relating to the norms under review. As a 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law,
27
 the ICRC study 
facilitates the task of identifying the judicial standards applicable in all 
armed conflicts. 
24 Stavros had the same idea more than a decade ago: Stephanos Stavros, The Right to a 
Fair Trial in Emergency Situations, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
41 (1992) 2, 343-365. 
25  A skeptical reader may point out that AP II only covers non-international armed 
conflicts of a certain intensity. A more detailed discussion of this aspect is beyond the 
scope of this article, but suffice it to say that in respect of the administration of justice, 
it seems to be safe to conclude that the judicial safeguards of Article 6 of the second 
protocol are implied by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions which applies 
to non-international armed conflicts in general. 
26 Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al. (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
(2003), Volumes 1 – 3. 
27  Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)d, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
3 Bevans 1179. 
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Article 75 of AP I provides a list of fair trial rights which State parties 
must afford to everyone affected by the conflict.
28
 As treaty law, Article 75 
only applies if the Additional Protocol applies as a whole. Even if it is 
plausible that the vast majority of fair trial guarantees in Article 75 are part 
of customary law, some might not warrant the same claim. This concern 
stems from the fact that the laws of non-international armed conflict allow 
lower standards in some respects. Interestingly, US Legal Advisors 
previously took the position that the entirety of Article 75 was customary in 
nature.
29
 But as long as there are potentially some aspects of Article 75 
which may not be part of customary law, I suggest comparing Article 75 
with its sister article, Article 6 of AP II.
30
 The list of safeguards which are 
common to both protocols provides the most authorative source of the 
customary minimum level of due process from which no derogation is 
allowed. As outlined above, this is because judicial standards applicable in 
both types of armed conflict apply to all States by virtue of being part of 
general international law. The length of this essay precludes the comparison 
of each sub-paragraph of Article 14 with the two protocols and the results of 
the ICRC study. Elsewhere, I found at least twelve elements of Article 14 to 
be effectively non-derogable.
31
G. Current Developments and Some Thoughts on the 
Relevance of the Derogation Regime 
In reality, however, measures relating to the administration of justice 
in the context of the “war on terror” continue to disregard non-derogable 
safeguards and the Guantánamo fiasco may only be the tip of the iceberg. 
28  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Art. 75, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
29 Michael Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary 
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
American University International Law Review 2 (1987), 415, 420 and 427. 
30  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Art. 6, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
31 Evelyne Schmid, The Right to a Fair Trial in States of Emergencies: Non-Derogable 
Aspects of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
15 April 2008, available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2008/Schmid.pdf (last 
visited 29 September 2008). 
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As recently confirmed by the US Supreme Court in the case of Boumediene 
et al. v. Bush, the American military commissions post Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld
32
still fall short of domestic constitutional guarantees and a 
majority of the US Supreme Court held that the prisoners detained in 
Guantánamo had a right to a review of their detention and that the US 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional suspension of 
that right.
33
 In the concluding paragraph of the Court’s opinion, Justice 
Kennedy emphatically writes that “the laws and the Constitution are 
designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and 
security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the 
framework of the law.”
34
 Although the Court’s decision obviously analyzes 
the Military Commissions Act and the Detainee Treatment Act with 
reference to the US legal system, the majority’s conclusion echoes the idea 
that some rights are too fundamental to ever be dispensed with. The US 
“Combatant Status Review Tribunals” are also inconsistent with the non-
derogable judicial standards of international law and, in my view, have been 
counterproductive to the aim of reducing the threat of violence. 
Just as the US Supreme Court in Boumediene et al. v. Bush mentions 
how the framers of the Constitution decided that some rights must always be 
a part of the law,
35
 the drafters of the ICCPR spent considerable time and 
thought on regulating what a government should be allowed to do in 
difficult situations. Armed conflict and terrorism were very much part of 
what they understood as “an emergency threatening the life of the nation”.
36
32 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006), Supreme Court of the United States. The 
Court is concluding that the military commissions to try Guantánamo detainees 
violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
33 Boumediene et al. v. Bush, 553 US (2008), Supreme Court of the United States, 6. 
34 Id., 70. 
35 Id., 70. 
36  The original proposals of the derogation clause explicitly referred to “the time of war 
and other public emergency”. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/188 (16 May 1949) and UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.127, 12 (17 June 1949), where the wording was provisionally adopted. 
Because the UN was established with the aim to prevent war, the delegates later 
suppressed the mention of war and preferred to adopt a broad term instead (UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR. 330 (1 July 1952). In 1962, a study by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights summarizes the circumstances which could justify the proclamation of a state 
of emergency. Even if the list does not contain the word "terrorism", it includes 
circumstances such as the defense or security of the State or parts of the country, civil 
war, rebellion, insurrection, subversion, harmful activities of counter-revolutionary 
elements, disturbances of peace, public order or safety, danger to the constitution and 
authorities created by it, etc. See UN Commission on Human Rights, Study of the 
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It is therefore not warranted to claim the inappropriateness of international 
law. Rather, we need to stress the advantages of the framework of the legal 
regulation of emergency measures. 
For instance, abiding by the derogation regime and strictly 
safeguarding non-derogable rights would increase the prospects of 
international law enforcement cooperation much needed in the “war on 
terror”. Other States will be more willing to use evidence gained by foreign 
authorities in their domestic courts if they are confident that the evidence 
was gained without involving cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or even 
torture. The Hamburg Terror Trials involving suspected organizers of the 
9/11 attacks are a good illustration of the importance of transatlantic judicial 
cooperation. The legal and practical ramifications of the unavailability of 
the key witness, a detainee in US custody not allowed to travel, and the 
impossibility of disclosing the interrogation records provided by the CIA 
most probably impacted the outcome of the proceedings.
37
 Had the US 
notified a derogation shortly after the 9/11 attacks and had that derogation 
strictly abided by Article 4 of the ICCPR, not all difficulties might have 
been solved, but most commentators would probably have granted the right 
to derogate at that time, and the measures would at least have been based on 
the framework of the rule of law. This may in turn have avoided the series 
of ad hoc policies relating to the trials of foreign terrorist suspects and the 
damage in terms of reputation and credibility. 
Even if negative in tone, derogations are a form of validation for 
governments invoking emergency powers. This legitimization was however 
voluntarily conditioned by the drafters of the Covenant. It is problematic for 
the international rule system that this legitimization model seems to have 
lost its attraction for the most powerful member and the original force 
behind the regime in question. The ambiguities surrounding the concept of 
armed conflict in the “war on terror” emphasize the need for a more 
rigorous approach on the part of treaty bodies overseeing the validity of the 
assertion of a state of emergency and the measures taken.
38
 Moreover, as 
underlined by Judge Simma in his separate opinion to the DRC v. Uganda
case, other States are far too hesitant to assert the community’s interest in 
ensuring that “ongoing attempts to dismantle important elements of these 
Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/826/Rev.1 (1962), 257. 
37 Timo Kost, Mounir El Motassadeq – A Missed Chance for Weltinnenpolitik?, German 
Law Journal 8 (2007) 4, 443-454. 
38 Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human 
Rights, European Journal of International Law, 14 (2003) 2, 252. 
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branches of international law [human rights and humanitarian law] in the 
proclaimed ‘war’ on international terrorism”
39
 are addressed. 
H. Conclusion 
The reactions to the September 11 attacks have renewed the debate on 
what is permissible in situations of exigency. This article has suggested a 
methodology to determine the minimum list of fair trial guarantees to be 
provided to all suspects. It has examined which judicial standards have to be 
provided in all situations by virtue of customary international law relating to 
both types of armed conflict and the prohibition of derogation measures 
which are inconsistent with the minimum humanitarian level of due process. 
States have voluntarily accepted this minimum level of fair trial rights when 
they designed the procedures laid out in Article 4 of the ICCPR. This essay 
has elaborated on the Human Rights Committee’s holding that certain 
fundamental principles of fair trial can never be dispensed with if torture 
and other explicitly non-derogable rights shall be effectively protected.
40
 In 
its second most recent General Comment, the Human Rights Committee has 
confirmed that “deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, 
including the presumption of innocence, is prohibited at all times.”
41
Derogation clauses were included in the ICCPR to allow a State to 
defend its population from extraordinary threats. At the same time, 
derogation clauses contain a number of criteria concerning the extent to 
which the temporary curtailment of rights is tolerable. 
The principle of consistency contained in Article 4(1) of the ICCPR 
requires that derogation measures are consistent with a State’s other 
international legal obligations. Based on the principle of consistency, I have 
argued that those aspects of fair trial which are common to the legal regimes 
dealing with international armed conflict on the one hand and internal armed 
conflicts on the other must be provided in all types of emergency, including 
in emergencies which fall short of the legal threshold of an armed conflict. 
Any derogation from these aspects would be inconsistent with the 
customary law which remains applicable even in the worst cases of 
emergency, and therefore invalidate the derogation. Applying this 
39 Simma, 12 (para. 38) (supra note 17). 
40  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ 
Add.11 (2001), para. 11. 
41  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), 
paras 6 and 19. 
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methodology leads to a list of non-derogable judicial safeguards and a 
strong contention against all arguments that certain individuals are situated 
in an unspecified gap between two bodies of law. 
